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Energy and Competitiveness
W hen energy prices are expected to rise over the next twenty years, it is essential that industrial innovation eﬀ orts and the 
supply of goods and service oﬀ erings be directed towards 
energy-eﬃ  cient technologies. However, a more signiﬁ cant 
increase in energy prices in France than in other countries 
would be detrimental to the short-term competitiveness of 
French industry.
The present Note outlines the terms of the trade-oﬀ 
France has to confront between preserving a signiﬁ cant 
part of its short-term competitiveness (its relatively low 
energy costs, particularly where electricity is concerned) 
and the necessary transformation of its mid-long-term 
comparative advantages (as the result of realistic energy 
pricing). Based on an original econometric study examining 
the export activities of French companies, we estimate that 
a 10% increase in electricity prices in France would reduce 
the value of exports by an average 1.9% and that the same 
increase in the price of gas would reduce it by 1.1%. The 
loss in competitiveness is notably more signiﬁ cant for 
larger exporters, particularly in those sectors that depend 
heavily on energy. This short-term negative eﬀ ect should 
be balanced against the signalling eﬀ ect of an increase 
in energy prices on mid-long-term specialisations in order 
for France not to get left behind in the “green” innovation 
race. Several lessons we can be drawn from this analysis.
Firstly, the increase in energy prices should be announced 
in a credible way so that economic agents can include 
it in their calculations and revise their consumption and 
production choices as appropriate. In addition, in order 
to limit the negative eﬀ ects of increasing energy costs on 
short-term competitiveness, we would recommend that:
•  additional energy taxation be used to reduce the 
labour cost;
•  proceeding with great caution with regards to the rate 
at which legacy nuclear facilities, the cost per kWh of 
which is particularly attractive, are decommissioned;
•  a diﬀ erentiated attribution of the public service charge 
according to energy intensity (as is the case in Ger-
many);
•  a convergence of approaches at European level with 
regards to network costs.
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Global energy prices are expected to rise in the medium 
term by 15% for coal and 50% for oil and gas over the next twen-
ty years.1 Having said that, it is diﬃ  cult to have absolute faith in 
these forecasts in the long-term. As was recently demonstra-
ted by the very marked drop in gas prices in the United States 
following the exploitation of shale gas, the introduction of new 
technologies that will make it possible to exploit new depo-
sits makes it diﬃ  cult to forecast. The seven-fold increase in oil 
prices in dollars since 2000, however, would suggest that other 
factors (and in particular demand from emerging countries) 
will continue to drive up energy prices.
The increasing importance of environmental issues and in par-
ticular that of global warming should also result in the “true” 
cost of energy being taken into greater consideration when 
it comes to public policy. This is, in any case, the path the 
French government has decided to take with its reﬂ ection on 
the diversiﬁ cation of energy sources (the energy transition), 
which followed the long-term energy-saving plan (the Grenelle 
de l’Environnement agreement). Increasing fuel prices, combi-
ned with the development of renewable energy sources, will 
automatically increase electricity prices. With this in mind, the 
French Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) anticipates a 30% 
increase in the price of electricity for households by 2017. The 
increases facing manufacturers will be less signiﬁ cant - 24% 
for the tarif jaune rate and 16% for customers on the tarif vert.2
The present Note aims to analyse the impact of a likely increase 
in energy prices on the competitiveness of France and more 
speciﬁ cally on the performance of exporting companies.3 The 
decline in the competitiveness of France has been the subject 
of various convergent diagnoses.4 Indeed, it was the Gallois 
Report that inspired the French government’s Pacte pour la 
compétitivité, la croissance et l’emploi5 (“Competitiveness, 
Growth and Employment Pact”). More recently, this alarmist 
diagnosis was reiterated in the European Commission’s report 
of April 2013 published as part of the procedure for preventing 
excessive macroeconomic imbalances.6
Our country ﬁ nds itself in a somewhat unusual situation due 
to its energy mix and its very speciﬁ c electricity pricing policy, 
with prices generally lower than those of our European com-
petitors. On this point, the Gallois Report concluded that, “the 
price of electrical energy for industry is relatively low in France 
and represents a major advantage that has to be maintained”. 
We agree with this assessment, despite the diﬃ  culties asso-
ciated with measurement. Its implications must, however, 
be considered from a mid-long-term perspective, taking into 
account imbalances in the markets concerned.
Should the government anticipate the increase in energy costs 
by increasing the taxation and pricing of energy? Is it better 
to protect intermediate energy consumers (manufacturers) 
from this increase by delaying it? Should the government 
allow  “market trends”  to send a signal of scarcity to users 
(and energy producers) to help them adjust? In this latter 
case, should the increase be accompanied by appropriate 
subsidy plans that would make the adjustment less painful?
Whilst diﬃ  cult for economic policy, these issues are partic-
ularly menacing when considered from a competitiveness 
perspective. Energy is a cost to French businesses and the 
increase in costs in France, and wage costs in parti cular, 
goes some way towards explaining the slump in France’s 
external trade and more generally the decline in industrial 
employment.
In the present Note we shall be focusing on the impact of an 
increase in energy prices on competitiveness and attempting 
to distinguish between the short-term and long-term eﬀ ects, 
which may well diﬀ er. In the short-term, with companies 
taking technology for granted, energy is a cost. In the lon-
ger-term, the price of energy is a signal to both manufactu-
rers and end-consumers; the demand for buildings, produc-
tion processes and products that are energy-eﬃ  cient or use 
new forms of energy could give rise to a “national” supply, 
thus dynamically creating new comparative advantages for 
French industry and the associated services.7 The issue of 
competitiveness therefore takes on a diﬀ erent dimension in 
the short and long terms. In the short term, it might be seen 
as a company’s ability to increase its export activity or enter 
foreign markets, in which case the cost of energy has a nega-
tive impact on competitiveness. In the long term, competiti-
veness at national is synonymous with growth and in particu-
lar in productivity growth which must take into account not 
only production eﬃ  ciency and the development of new sec-
tors but also the quality and environmental footprint of the 
products in question.
We would like to thank Stéphane Saussier, Scientiﬁ c Advisor at the CAE, and Gianluca Oreﬁ ce, Economist at the CEPII, for their help and support.
1 See International Energy Agency (2012): World Energy Outlook.
2 Commission de Régulation de l’Energie (2013): Le fonctionnement des marchés de détail français de l’électricité et du gaz naturel, 2011-2012 Report, 
January.
3 The impact of environmental policy on the competitiveness of companies has been studied in Bureau D. and M. Mougeot, (2004): Politiques environnementales 
et compétitivité, CAE Report, no 54, La Documentation française.
4 See, for example, Fontagné L. and G. Gaulier (2008): Performances à l’exportation de la France et de l’Allemagne, CAE Report, no 81, La Documentation 
française.
5 Gallois L. (2012): Pacte pour la compétitivité de l’industrie française, Report to the Prime Minister, La Documentation française, 5 November.
6 European Commission (2013): In-Depth Review for France in Accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EU) no 1176/2011 on the Prevention and Correction 
of Macroeconomic Imbalances, European Commission SWD(2013) 117 ﬁ nal.
7 We do not undervalue the fact that competition is now a global matter. However, a ﬂ ourishing domestic market might be a pre-requisite for the introduction 
of new activities.
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Whilst the increase in energy costs reﬂ ects scarcity and the 
need to take into account environmental costs, the correct 
policy is not to isolate the intermediate consumer (compa-
nies) or the ﬁ nal one (households)) from this reality. Insofar 
as foreign competitors would be facing the same cost varia-
tions, isolating French companies would result in subsidies 
for exports through distorted energy prices and delays in the 
necessary technological adjustment.
Artiﬁ cially maintaining low energy costs in the road haulage 
sector, for example, eﬀ ectively amounts to subsidising both 
exports and imports. Trade that is artiﬁ cially supported in 
this way by under-pricing in the road haulage sector does 
not appear to be eﬀ ective, particularly within the European 
Union, where supply chains are extremely complex. Another 
example is the the recent episode of the temporary tax reduc-
tion applied to fuel in order to limit the impact of the increase 
in oil prices on motorists; indeed, the line between protec-
ting purchasing power and encouraging changes in consumer 
behaviour is a very thin one.
Furthermore, “subsidising energy” still has to be funded; in 
the case of France, taxing employment more heavily whilst 
reducing tax on energy would be a step in the wrong direc-
tion and would not tackle the core issues of price and non-
price competitiveness. Furthermore, whilst this subsidising 
might not be perceived as a sustainable solution, it will not 
prevent relocations and will have a deadweight eﬀ ect only for 
the companies that beneﬁ t from it.
From a general economic perspective, one of the diﬃ  culties 
of the discussion surrounding “energy and competitiveness” is 
the asymmetry between certain energy-intense sectors, which 
are exposed to a price divergence between France and foreign 
competitors, and the rest of the economy, which is only mar-
ginally aﬀ ected by this discussion and where the potential to 
create jobs depends primarily on the cost of employment.
The distorsions generated by a degree of commercial mer-
cantilism are visible on an international scale. It would the-
refore be fair to say that “environmental dumping” is often a 
reality; the governments soften their environmental policies 
to improve competitiveness in certain sectors at a cost that 
a cost-beneﬁ t analysis would deem excessive given the envi-
ronmental damage it causes. Within Europe itself, the design 
errors in the carbon market clearly reﬂ ect the eﬀ ectiveness 
of pressure groups that have succeeded in introducing rather 
lenient global emission caps and quota allocation methods, 
which are a source of major deadweight eﬀ ects.
The lesson to be learnt from the present Note is that econo-
mic policy is treading the thin line between a low price, desi-
gned to maintain competitiveness in the short term but bur-
dening the long-term adjustments required, and a high price 
that would reduce cost competitiveness and therefore indus-
trial employment in the short term but which would provide 
the incentives required for the switch towards an energy-eﬃ  -
cient energy economy.
The remainder of the present Note is structured as follows: 
the ﬁ rst section outlines the diagnosis of the loss of com-
petitiveness in France, the second section analyses energy 
prices in France for manufacturers from a comparative pers-
pective, the following section deals with the mechanisms 
that connect competitiveness and energy prices, the fourth 
section attempts to gauge how companies’ export activities 
react to variations in energy prices and the ﬁ nal section out-
lines a series of economic policy recommendations.
The loss of competitiveness in France
An economic policy objective might be to increase French 
exports (i.e. exports by companies located within the country, 
such as Danone, Toyota, etc.) and even to increase them at 
the rate of global demand. In the latter case, which is general-
ly the one upheld in economic policy discussion, it is impor-
tant to ensure that global market shares are maintained.8
The cost of labour (which has been explained since 2008 
by the burden of social contributions and the stagnation 
in productivity in relation to wages)9 has aﬀ ected the cost 
competitiveness of French exporters, who have suppressed 
their prices by reducing their margins. The latter are now 
the lowest in the Euro zone and this phenomenon is even 
more pronounced in the manufacturing sector. In addition to 
this, there are also the well-known non-price factors (expor-
ter demographics, lack of inclination to export on the part 
of medium-sized companies, lack of innovation) to take into 
account. The 2012 reduction in the trade deﬁ cit, owing pri-
marily to record sales in the aeronautics industry and a lack 
of domestic demand, does nothing to alter the competiti-
veness diagnosis according to the European Commission 
(op.cit.). Indeed, French export market shares dropped 11% 
between 2006 and 2011.10
This decline in French export market shares has been the 
subject of much commentary.  The image of this deteriora-
tion is all the more evident when considered in relation to 
the situation in Germany (Graph 1). With the exception of the 
leather, leather goods and shoe sector that was driven by the 
luxury brands, France’s relative performance in relation to 
Germany in 2010 (vertical axis) was still poorer than in 2000 
8 In reality, it is a case of not losing more market share than the average for OECD countries, which are ﬁ nding themselves forced to take a step back in the 
global market as new competitors emerge.
9 See Askenazy P., A. Bozio and C. García-Peñalosa (2013): “Dynamique des salaires par temps de crise”, Note du CAE, no 5.
10 This decline was nevertheless twice as fast between 2003 and 2008, before the divergence of wages and productivity in France. For a deﬁ nition of the 
indi cators see European Commission (2012): “Scoreboard for the Surveillance of Macroeconomic Imbalances”, European Economy Occasional Papers, no 92.
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(horizontal axis). This included sectors where France’s glo-
bal market share was greater than that of Germany in 2000, 
namely agriculture and the food-processing industry.
These changes reﬂ ect the growing (in)compatibility of the 
national export oﬀ ering with global demand in terms of range 
and variety of goods, geographic targeting of exports and 
price.11
Energy prices in France
Unlike fossil fuel prices, which are often relatively uniform in 
the global market, electricity and natural gas prices have a 
much wider range, which is why we shall focus here on the 
price of these two energy sources in particular.12
Price of electricity: the current situation
France occupies a special position that reﬂ ects on the one 
hand the scale of its nuclear power network and on the other 
the strict pricing regulation on the part of the government. 
The unique nature of the French situation results in a very low 
electricity price not only for households but also for the majo-
rity of businesses. For historic reasons, only four European 
countries have lower prices than those observed in France, 
namely Romania, Estonia, Bulgaria and Finland (see Graph 2).
Comparison at the international level (see following table) 
further underlines the unique situation in France. Whilst this 
diﬀ erence in favour of French manufacturers might have 
decreased over time, European prices in general more clo-
sely look like German prices - it is France that ﬁ nds itself in 
an unusual position. Despite the marked increase in electri-
city prices for French manufacturers since 2008 (+16%, the 
7th greatest increase within the OECD, behind Switzerland 
and Japan with +40% and +29% respectively), French manu-
facturers, according to the IEA, maintained an average advan-
tage of 23% over their German counterparts. The handicap is 
nevertheless a very signiﬁ cant one with regards to the United 
States (75%, cf. table) and could increase further given that 
American industrial electricity will track shale gas prices.13
11 For reasons of statistical availability, only market share relating to goods is generally taken into consideration, to the consequent exclusion of services.
12 For a more comprehensive analysis of electricity and gas pricing policies in Europe see Chevalier J-M. and J. Percebois (2008): Gaz et électricité : un déﬁ  
pour l’Europe et pour la France, CAE report, no 74, La Documentation française. The volatility of energy prices can also aﬀ ect companies. See on this matter 
Artus P., A. d’Autume, P. Chalmin and J-M. Chevalier (2010): Les eﬀ ets d’un prix du pétrole élevé et volatil, CAE report, no 93, La Documentation française.
13 The Table on page 5 cannot be directly compared to Graph 2. Indeed, Eurostat compares a typical 2,000MWh industrial contract corresponding to medium-
sized plant facilities whilst the IEA compares averages prices, therefore taking into account diﬀ erent consumption volumes.
2. Price of electricity for households 
and businesses in Europe
In euros per kWh, 2011
Notes: a Annual consumption between 500 and 2,000MWh; b Annual 
consumption between 2,500 and 5,000kWh; excl. of VAT.
Source: According to Eurostat.
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1. Ratio of global market shares of France to those 
of Germany
By sector in 2000 and 2010
Reading: In 2000, France’s global market share of the agricultural in-
dustry was almost twice that of Germany. A decade later it was just one 
and a half times that of Germany.
1.  Mining and Quarrying; 2. Textiles and Textile Products; 3.  Wood 
and Products of Wood and Cork; 4.  Pulp, Paper, Paper, Printing and 
Publishing; 5.  Chemicals and Chemical Products; 6. Rubber and 
Plastics; 7.  Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products; 8.  Basic Metals 
and Fabricated Metal Products; 9. Machinery, Nec; 10.  Electrical and 
Optical Equipment; 11.  Transport Equipment; 12. . Manufacturing, 
Nec; Recycling.
Source: Calculations based on BACI-CEPII.
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Electricity pricing
The pricing of the electricity supplied to major manufactu-
rers is an issue that has come under regular scrutiny, even 
in the days when EDF had the monopoly on production and 
was calling for better tariﬀ s in the name of competitiveness. 
EDF pointed out that with regards to the current networks 
(thermal and nuclear), electrical production is fundamen-
tally an activity where unit costs remain constant, meaning 
that they do not decrease for higher volumes produced. Of 
course, the cost of equipment is proportional to the genera-
ting capacity and the cost of fuel proportional to the energy 
used. This left little room for maneuver, with the margina-
list pricing struture (EDF’s tarif vert) passing the costs that 
were directly attributable to them on to the diﬀ erent users, 
thus ensuring a ﬁ nancial balance without cross-subsidisation 
between consumers. Furthermore, EDF rather appeared to 
be an eﬃ  cient producer. Under these conditions, the idea 
of restoring the balance of funding between manufacturers 
and domestic consumers appeared to be a pure distortion of 
“realistic pricing”. Nowadays, manufacturers also have the 
option of choosing their producer. Believing that the libera-
lisation of the market would be in their interests, they were, 
however, disappointed when they noted that this was instead 
resulting in an increase in prices.14 This increase in prices 
does not mean that the country as a whole did not come out 
a winner, but simply that the distribution of the gains achie-
ved through the opening up of the market favours electricity 
producers rather than consumers. The Nome Law rectiﬁ ed 
this situation by arranging access to the production of the 
legacy nuclear network.
The pricing of electricity for industrial use must distinguish 
between what comes under direct costs, on the one hand, 
and the coverage of ﬁ xed costs and the funding of public wor-
king charges, on the other.
Consumers, whoever they may be, must cover their direct 
costs, otherwise there is no guarantee that their demand is 
economically justiﬁ ed. “Subsidised” electricity, for example, 
will oust direct electricity exports, which would result in a 
better margin for the economy. The direct costs associated 
with electricity production are very closely proportional to 
consumption. In this respect, there is no room for a volume 
“discount” approach, which would lead to users making ill-
informed choices and being poorly prepared for future deve-
lopments. Furthermore, by limiting the funding of new equip-
ment this would also run the risk of under-investment that 
these very industries would later come to regret. For the same 
reasons of realistic pricing, it is only to be expected that CO2 
quotas (the price of CO2 having slumped far too much nowa-
days) be fully incorporated into the pricing structure.
Generally speaking, the demand for electricity is now heavily 
inﬂ uenced by the importance of regulated prices wich result 
in an inaccurate or incomplete reﬂ ection of cost. Shielding 
major consumers from market prices in this way will result in 
them making ineﬃ  cient energy choices.15
The question of funding the ﬁ xed costs of the network and 
public service charges, which includes funding drops in lear-
ning curves relating to renewable energy sources, howe-
ver, is a legitimate one. From an economic perspective, it is 
only rational for heavy electricity users who are also major 
exporters to pay less towards the ﬁ xed costs since the ave-
rage cost (of the network and the public service charge) is 
lower for these heavy users. In fact, this is already the case 
since the public electricity service charge (CSPE) is capped 
at €550,000 per industrial site and 0.5% of the added value 
of the company for industrial companies using more than 
7GWh. Once the CSPE cap that applies in France and the 
exemption from or reimbursement of taxes corresponding to 
the CSPE and the TURPE (French public electricity network 
usage charge) in Germany are taken into account, the diﬀ e-
14 The increase in prices was economically predictable, with the openness of the markets concerned resulting in an intermediate price between those that 
had previously been in force in the diﬀ erent countries. In this instance, France was, in fact, towards the lower end of the scale in terms of production costs.
15 For a more comprehensive analysis see Crampes C. and T-O Léautier (2012): Dix propositions pour faire entrer l’industrie électrique française dans le XXIe 
siècle, École d’Economie de Toulouse.
Average price of industrial electricity in the OECD 
Incl. taxes (2011), in dollars/TOE
Source: Agence internationale de l’énergie (2013): “End-Use Prices: 
Energy Prices in National Currency per TOE”, IEA Energy Prices and 
Taxes Statistics Database.
  2008 2011 
Italy 3 370 3 248 
Ireland 2 162 1 772 
Hungary 1 973 1 561 
Japan 1 620 2 082 
Germany 1 499 1 828 
OECD Europe 1 660 1 744 
Belgium 1 612 1 611 
Netherlands 1 545 1 378 
Turkey 1 614 1 612 
United Kingdom 1 697 1 481 
Portugal 1 527 1 618 
Poland 1 387 1 416 
Greece 1 306 1 460 
Denmark 1 510 1 339 
France 1 219 1 413 
OECD Total 1 270 1 436 
Spain 1 455 1 730 
Finland 1 127 1 321 
Switzerland 1 090 1 531 
Sweden 1 109 1 212 
United States 794 809 
New-Zealand 831 857 
6Les notes du conseil d’analyse économique, no 6
Energy and Competitiveness
rential in the cost of electricity excluding tax between French 
and German electro-intensive industrial users (tarif vert-type) 
is greatly reduced but remains around 12% more favourable 
to France (cf. Eurostat and the Union Française d Electricité 
(“French Electricity Association”)). The policy governing the 
reimbursement of certain taxes to electro-intensive manu-
facturers nevertheless appears to be reaching the limits of 
tolerance for households in Germany, who are entirely res-
ponsible for funding it. It is certainly worth considering fol-
lowing Germany’s lead and partially reimbursing such taxes 
and network charges (CSPE and TURPE), but it is ﬁ rst and 
foremost important to ensure a convergence of approaches 
at European level where network costs are concerned.
Electricity production costs
Above and beyond the issue of pricing, the price of electricity 
depends on the cost of the various fuels and equipment used. 
It is therefore essential to the competitiveness of our econo-
my that these costs be controlled, something which must be 
taken fully into account when examining the various potential 
scenarios regarding the development of our electricity pro-
duction facilities.
In this respect, the total cost per MWh for the various equip-
ment that is likely to be commissioned by 2030 would appear 
to be noticeably higher than that of the “legacy” nuclear 
network, in terms of both new renewable energy sources (oﬀ -
shore wind farms and photovoltaic energy), new nuclear ener-
gy and gas cycles, the latter also generating large amounts of 
greenhouse gas emissions. There is much at stake here, since 
the average production cost variance over the same period is 
estimated at around 30%, or even more, between the scena-
rios involving the decommissioning of existing 40GWs of the 
legacy nuclear network and those in which it would prima-
rily be postponed until after 2030 (irrespective of the type 
of technology adopted for replacement). Decommissioning 
the facilities in question too quickly would also risk putting 
a strain on capacity.
The price of gas
The price of gas in France is around the European average. 
The use of shale gas in the United States (which accounts for 
nearly a third of the country’s gas consumption), however, has 
resulted in gas there being around three times less expensive 
than it is in Europe. This signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence in price has a 
major impact on competitiveness and choice of location on the 
part of companies in certain industrial sectors, such as the 
chemicals industry. Above and beyond its positive impact on 
employment and the balance of trade, the use of shale gas 
in France would nevertheless have a less signiﬁ cant impact 
on prices than in the United States, where prices have drop-
ped 67% in ﬁ ve years; indeed, given that production costs will 
remain higher in Europe than in the United States,16 the cost 
of shale gas in Europe would be comparable to the estimated 
cost of liqueﬁ ed gas imported from the United States, which 
would therefore maintain its competitive edge. This less signi-
ﬁ cant impact on prices than in the United Stated must the-
refore be juxtaposed with the environmental eﬀ ects of using 
shale gas. For want of short-term exploitation, we believe that 
research should be carried out into the cleanest and least cost-
ly techniques for exploiting shale gas, in accordance with one 
of the recommendations of the Gallois Report
Ultimately, irrespective of the energy source, it would not 
be appropriate to base our arguments on prices per se. 
These prices include production costs, distribution margins 
and taxes. Production costs will naturally increase as they 
reﬂ ect issues associated with scarcity or the increased consi-
deration of safety in the nuclear ﬁ eld; taxes will increase if 
we want to send a message to French economic players; 
but what will become of the margins? This issue cannot be 
resolved without an accurate analysis of the conditions of 
competition observed in energy sectors (which are by their 
very nature highly concentrated). In this respect, the regula-
tion of the sector will be key.
What eﬀ ects can we expect 
an increase in energy prices 
to have on competitiveness?
Variations in a country’s market shares can be partially 
explained by price competitiveness and this is particularly 
true in the case of France. The geographical or product-spe-
ciﬁ c structure of the country’s exports, and even non-price 
competition factors (such as product quality or image), also 
have a role to play. This reality should not, however, conceal 
another, namely the fact that at the product level,considering 
sales by a company in a particular market, the response in 
terms of sales volume to price variations (corrected for qua-
lity) is undeniable. Increasing prices but not quality would 
result in a reduction in exports (to an extent that would 
depend on the nature of the goods and the market structure 
and the degree of competitiveness thereof).
In the case at hand, a greater increase in energy prices in 
France than in other countries would result in a decline in 
the export performance of companies located in France, all 
other things being equal. An analysis of the competitiveness 
of a country should therefore take into account the fact that 
it is not the country that is exporting but rather the company. 
Companies vary in terms of productivity, size, sector of acti-
vity, presence in international markets and proﬁ tability and a 
particular impact on energy prices is also, therefore, likely to 
have varying consequences.
16 See International Energy Agency (2012): Perspectives énergétiques mondiales.
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The short-term eﬀ ects
The price of energy is one of the many factors that deter-
mine exporters’ prices in foreign markets. The various factors 
that determine price notably include the costs of other inter-
mediate consumptions, the cost of labour, transport and dis-
tribution costs, any potential customs duties, the exchange 
rate and export margins. The relative weight of these diﬀ e-
rent aspects varies from one sector to the next. In all cases, 
however, a more marked increase in the price of energy in 
France than in other countries will be detrimental in the short 
term to the cost competitiveness of French exporters. As is 
the case with any increase in cost, companies can react by 
increasing the price of their products, which will have a nega-
tive impact on their export sales.
This increase in cost can also have the eﬀ ect of forcing some 
exporting companies (those that are the least productive) to 
abandon their export activities. Indeed, the reduction in their 
sales reduces their export revenue, and for some this loss of 
revenue will mean they are no longer able to oﬀ set the speci-
ﬁ c costs associated with export (transportation, tariﬀ s, crea-
tion of a distribution network, etc.).
Faced with such an increase in costs, exporting companies 
might also decide to reduce their margins. In choosing not to 
pass the increased costs on to their customers (or at least not 
in their entirety), they will eﬀ ectively experience a decrease 
in their margins, a decrease that could well result in an even-
tual loss of competitiveness. Indeed, it might even aﬀ ect the 
ability of such companies to fund their investments and their 
research and development expenditure. Such investments 
have an impact on their future productivity and therefore 
their future ability to export.
The mid-long-term eﬀ ects
In the longer-term, increasing energy costs could aﬀ ect the 
country’s specialisation, as is observed in the case of envi-
ronmental regulations; comparative advantage in industries 
that use the most pollutant of technologies is reduced, resul-
ting in relocations. A recent study17 conﬁ rmed the signiﬁ cant 
eﬀ ect of environmental regulations on the international spe-
cialisation of countries in polluting industries. An increase in 
energy prices might also, however, encourage companies to 
innovate, as has been the case in the automotive industry,18 
by creating the appropriate domestic market conditions for 
clean technologies.
In the long term, the question that needs to be answered 
is that of the compatibility of what French industry has to 
oﬀ er with the needs of a more energy-eﬃ  cient economy. The 
question raises the issues of “green competitiveness” and 
a “ﬁ rst mover” advantage (sometimes known as the “Porter 
eﬀ ect”)19 can be enjoyed both in this ﬁ eld and in others ﬁ elds 
of innovation. The growth of the green economy requires exis-
ting sectors to be transformed with the emergence of cleaner 
products and production technologies (the emergence of a 
low-emissions technology in the automotive sector) and the 
birth and expansion of new sectors (the production of solar 
panels).
Aghion et al. (op.cit.) emphasize the notion of temporal 
dependence for the emergence of new industries; companies 
tend to invest in the technologies with which they are familiar, 
1. Companies and competitiveness
Empirical worka that uses very rich and detailed com-
pany data both for France and other European countries 
has achieved some very strong results with regards to 
the links between the competitiveness of companies, 
productivity and export activity, including the following:
 – the export activity of a country is heavily concentra-
ted around a small number of companies. In France, 
for example, 90% of aggregate exports are the work 
of just 5% of exporting companies. This concentra-
tion can also be observed in Germany, though to a 
slightly lesser degree, with 80% of aggregate exports 
produced by 5% of exporters. It is therefore impor-
tant to analyse the impact of an increase in energy 
costs on the largest exporters;
 – companies that export are larger and more produc-
tive than those that do not export. Their production 
process also uses more capital;
 – companies that export also import more interme-
diate goods than those that do not export, which 
helps increase their productivity and therefore their 
export performance;
 – exporting companies are more innovative in terms of 
both products and production processes and invest 
more heavily in R&D.
a See, for Europe, T. Mayer and G.M. Ottaviano (2007): “The Happy 
Few: New Facts on the Internationalisation of European Firms”, 
Bruegel-CEPR EFIM 2007 Report, Bruegel Blueprint Series.
17 Broner F., P. Bustos and V. Carvalho (2012): Sources of Comparative Advantage in Polluting Industries, Mimeo.
18 See Aghion P., A. Dechezleprêtre, D. Hemous, R.  Martin and J. Van Reenen (2012): “Carbon Taxes, Pathdependency and Direct Technical Change: Evidence 
from the Auto Industry”, NBER Working Paper, no 18596, December.
19 See Porter M.E. and C. Van der Linde (1995): “Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 9, no 4, pp. 97-118.
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namely “dirty” products and processes. It is therefore impor-
tant that clear and early indications of the new directions to 
take be given. Having said that, it is diﬃ  cult to document 
this process of “re-specialisation” as it is already under way, 
notably because it consists of a series of diﬀ use and there-
fore as yet poorly evaluated processes. It is not currently pos-
sible to conﬁ rm that the “Porter eﬀ ect” is a matter of basic 
fact. Indeed, it is diﬃ  cult to empirically prove that the early 
adoption of environmental requirements would “automatical-
ly” be a way of creating strategic advantage in international 
competition. We can, however, on the one hand, document 
how the introduction of realistic energy pricing stimulates 
innovation and, on the other hand, note that this process is 
currently a very active one.
Realistic pricing: based on American data, Popp (2002)20 
shows, for example, that over the 1970-1974 period, a 
10% increase in energy prices resulted in an average 3.5% 
increase in the number of patents ﬁ led in the energy sec-
tor, half of these in the ﬁ rst ﬁ ve years following the price 
increase. Likewise, Newell, Jaﬀ e and Stavins (1999)21 showed 
that energy eﬃ  ciency in 1993 would have been 25-50% 
lower in air-conditioning units and gas boilers if energy 
prices had stayed at their 1973 levels. A more recent study 
by Dechezleprêtre et al. (2008)22 made similar observations 
based on the ﬁ ling of patents between 1978 and 2003 in 
seven categories of renewable energy (wind power, solar, 
geothermal, marine energy, biomass, hydroelectricity and 
energy produced from waste) and six other ﬁ elds contribu-
ting to the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (destruc-
tion of methane, CO2 emission reduction processes for the 
manufacture of cement, energy eﬃ  ciency in construction, 
injection engines, low-energy lighting and the capture and 
storage of carbon). Finally, Aghion et al. (op.cit.) show that 
an increase in the price of petrol encourages businesses to 
direct their innovation eﬀ orts towards “clean” technologies 
and away from “dirty” technologies;23 a 10% increase in the 
price of petrol increases the number of patents in the ﬁ eld of 
clean technologies by 10%.
An active innovation process: studies by the OECD on green 
growth (op.cit.) show that the rate of innovation has increased 
for most of these technologies following the introduction of 
the Kyoto Protocol. This is particularly true of technologies 
such as wind power, certain solar systems, biofuels, geo-
thermal energy and hydraulics. Furthermore, data relating to 
venture capital investment in green technologies highlights a 
high level of growth over recent years. In 2010, nearly a quar-
ter of venture capital investment made in the United States 
related to clean energy technologies as opposed to less than 
1% in 2000, with key sectors including those of solar energy, 
transport, energy eﬃ  ciency, biofuels, smart grids and energy 
storage.
The impact of regulation, taxation and, in ﬁ ne, the cost of 
energy on economic players is reﬂ ected in a country’s ener-
gy eﬃ  ciency levels. At European level (Graph 3), that those 
countries with the highest levels of energy eﬃ  ciency (the 
lowest TOE intensity per euro of GDP) are also those with 
the highest levels of energy consumption taxation (implicit 
tax in euros by TOE). Although the technological “perfor-
mance” of marginal taxation is on the decline, there is clearly 
a decreasing relationship between taxation and energy inten-
sity. In this respect, the situation of France is pretty average.
It should, however, be noted that the comparative advantages 
that will emerge around new or changing sectors depend 
heavily on the comparative advantages that currently exist in 
technologically similar sectors (see Fankhauser et al. 2012). 
With this in mind, Germany has developed a comparative 
advantage in the wind turbine sector based on its existing 
expertise in the ﬁ eld of high-precision machines. In this res-
pect, there really is no “green” technology “miracle”.
20 Popp D. (2002): “Induced Innovation and Energy Prices”, American Economic Review, vol. 92, no 1, pp. 160-180.
21 Newell R., Jaﬀ e, A. and Stavins, R. (1999) “The Induced Innovation Hypothesis and Energy-Saving Technological Change”, The Quaterly Journal of Economics, 
vol. 114, no 3, pp. 3-29.
22 Dechezleprêtre A., M. Glachant, L. Hasic, N. Johnstone and M. Yann (2008): Invention and Transfer of Climate Mitigation Technologies on a Global Scale: A 
Study Drawing on Patent Data, Report for the French Development Agency.
23 “Clean” technologies are those relating to electrical, hybrid and hydrogen-powered vehicles. “Dirty” technologies are those associated with vehicles with 
combustion engines.
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How do variations in energy 
prices aﬀ ect the competitiveness 
of French companies?
Do energy price diﬀ erences between competitors aﬀ ect their 
export performance? The issues associated with competiti-
veness in the steel, aluminium, cement and fertiliser indus-
tries have come under particularly close examination in view of 
the implementation of the EU ETS, a unilateral European poli-
cy designed to ﬁ ght climate change. Indeed, the “unilateral” 
nature of the policy was somewhat concerning for two rea-
sons; on the one hand there was the concern not to excessi-
vely penalise the competitiveness of European industry and on 
the other the need to ensure that such policies would be eﬀ ec-
tive in achieving their objective of reducing CO2 emissions, 
which would not be the case if emission-producing production 
activities were simply relocated, a fortiori to countries using 
less eﬃ  cient technologies. This issue is known as “Carbon lea-
kage”. What interests us here is the impact of energy prices on 
export performance, rather than on carbon emissions.
In order to quantify the impact of increasing energy prices on 
competitiveness, we shall start by examining the aggregate 
trade data. Sato and Dechezleprêtre (2013)24 use a sample 
of 21 years and 51 countries covering 80% of global trade, 
combined with data relating to energy prices for manufactu-
rers in each country and for each type of energy (electricity, 
gas and fuel oil). They explain the export sales of each expor-
ting country in each foreign market in terms of the diﬀ erence 
in electricity prices and a series of regular control variables. 
Relatively higher electricity prices generally have a negative 
impact on exports out of the country imposing such prices, 
although this impact is limited. The elesticity is at most 0.2; 
for the most energy-dependent sectors25, a 10% increase in 
electricity prices reduces exports by 2%.
Another approach involves exploiting companies’ individual 
export data, which is the approach adopted in the present 
Note. What interests us here is the data relating to French 
exporters (i.e. those located in France) only. The energy 
dependence of each exporter is taken into account using that 
of the sector to which they belong.26 The analysis of individual 
data helps present a truly accurate picture of the impact of 
the increase in energy prices on French companies.
Clearly, not all industries are on an equal footing when it comes 
to an increase in the cost of energy. Sensitivity to an increase in 
energy prices relates directly to the use of energy and indirectly 
to the increase in the cost of intermediate consumption, which 
is itself energy-consuming. In this respect, the French automo-
tive industry is aﬀ ected through its own energy consumption 
and by the cost of the electricity used to manufacture glass 
and steel. Indeed, even the banking services provided to auto-
motive manufacturers are themselves energy-consuming. In 
order to demonstrate this interdependence of economic acti-
vities and the distribution of increased costs throughout the 
economic fabric, we shall adopt an upper bound of the eﬀ ects 
by outlining two hypotheses:
 – faced with an increase in energy prices, companies do 
not immediately change their technologies;
 – all intermediate consumption takes place in France and 
is therefore aﬀ ected by the cost increase (Renault, for 
example, does not buy its steel from Russia).27
We shall then calculate the direct (the purchasing of elec-
tricity by the automotive industry) and indirect (the purcha-
sing of electricity by those supplying glass to the automotive 
industry) energy content (in terms of value) of the production 
activities of each industry.
Graph 4 shows the sectors for which energy accounts for 
at least 10% of the production cost. The energy production 
sectors (reﬁ neries and electric power stations) have been 
excluded. The graph shows that after minerals, the second 
most heavily aﬀ ected sector is ﬁ shing. Service sectors, such 
as air and sea transport, also feature. The most heavily aﬀ ec-
ted manufacturing industry is chemicals, with the paper 
industry coming in second. In both of these sectors, ener-
gy accounts for around a ﬁ fth of the production cost. The 
metalworking, aluminium, rubber and food-processing indus-
tries are also very sensitive to the price of energy. Among the 
other sectors aﬀ ected, agriculture is more heavily aﬀ ected 
than the food-processing industry, the textile industry, the 
wood processing industry and even the IT industry. The pro-
portion of energy is therefore less than 10% for all those sec-
tors not shown here, which include, in decreasing order, auto-
motive, electrical machinery, metalworking, furniture and 
other industries, leather and shoe-making, publishing, tele-
communications equipment, other machines, clothing, other 
transport equipment, precision instruments and tobacco.
We shall now look at how the export activities of French compa-
nies operating in sectors with diﬀ erent levels of energy depen-
dence are aﬀ ected by energy prices. The method and the results 
are summarised in box 2. The primary results are as follows:
 – all other things being equal, a 10% increase in electri-
city prices in France reduces the value of exports by 
an average 1.9%, an estimation that reﬂ ects that of 
Sato and Dechezleprêtre (2013). We calculate a drop in 
exports of 1.1% for a 10% increase in gas prices;
24 Sato Misato and Dechezleprêtre A. (2013): “Asymmetric Industrial Energy Prices and International Trade”, LSE Working Paper.
25 The energy dependence of each sector is calculated using US data. The assumption is then made that the energy dependence of a particular sector is 
identical in every country in the world. This assumption helps correctly identify sector-speciﬁ c elasticities.
26 In order to avoid the endogeneity bias, energy dependence was measured in 2000 whilst the estimation itself begins in 2001.
27 In technical terms, this choice is justiﬁ ed by the unavailability of detailed input-output tables that distinguish between the origins of the products in 
question. We shall refrain, here, from using the so-called rule of “proportionality”.
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 – this eﬀ ect is noticeably greater for the largest expor-
ters and in particular those belonging to heavily energy-
dependent sectors;28
 – a more rapid increase in electricity prices in France than in 
other countries has a negative impact, particularly on the 
export activities of the largest French exporters belonging 
to the most heavily energy-dependent sectors. The same 
cannot be said of gas prices.29
On this basis it is possible to assess the impact of an increase 
in industrial electricity prices in France. We can therefore esti-
mate the eﬀ ect of an anticipated 20% increase in electricity 
prices30 for manufacturers by 2017 as estimated by the French 
Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE). Such an increase would 
reduce the value of French exports excluding energy by 3.8%. 
Based on the value of French non-energy exports in 2012, the 
cost in export activity of a 20% increase in electricity prices in 
France, all other things being equal, would therefore amount to 
some €16bn and would primarily aﬀ ect the largest exporters 
in the most energy-intensive sectors.
It is also possible to estimate the impact of the diﬀ erence of 
around 30% on the average cost of production per MWh, 
between the scenario involving the accelerated decommissio-
ning of the legacy nuclear network and that whereby its repla-
cement is primarily postponed until after 2030. Supposing that 
taxes remain the same and that this increase in cost is passed 
on to manufacturers, the increase in the price of electricity resul-
ting from this accelerated decommissioning would be around 
20%, again resulting in a drop in export activity of around 3.8%.
These estimations would suggest that electricity prices have 
a signiﬁ cant impact on competitiveness. The transforma-
tion of companies towards more energy-eﬃ  cient production 
methods is certainly a desirable possibility and could partial-
ly reduce the long-term eﬀ ects but the short-medium term 
eﬀ ects cannot be overlooked.
Energy costs aﬀ ect diﬀ erent industrial sectors in very dif-
ferent ways since energy represents only a limited propor-
tion of the costs incurred in many sectors. Other interme-
diate consumption, and indeed employment costs, account 
for a signiﬁ cant part of these overall costs. Manufacturing 
industries are ranked in Graph 5 according to their increasing 
(direct) work intensity (based on the total wage bill in rela-
tion to the value of output). This demonstrates that with the 
exception of the chemicals, metalworking, aluminium and 
paper industries, the cost of the energy used to produce is 
nevertheless modest in relation to the cost of employment.
This comparison really comes into its own when comparing 
the taxation of the two production factors in question, namely 
labour and energy. Graph 6 indicates from an international 
comparison perspective the ranking of countries in accor-
dance with the levy rate applicable to the two production fac-
4. Total energy content of branch production
2007
Reading: Manufacturing industries in grey.
Source: According to the INSEE’s table of French imports and exports.
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30 We shall take the average of the anticipated increases of 24% in the tarif jaune and 16% in the tarif vert.
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tors. France is shown to tax labour very heavily and energy less 
so. The data shown in Graph 6 does not take into account the 
competitiveness and employment tax credit (CICE) that has 
been in force since 1 January 2013 and equates to a reduction 
in social contributions. Although the CICE does not challenge 
the observation of a high level of taxation on employment in 
France, it is a step in the right direction. This international com-
parison places the impact of the cost of energy on competi-
tiveness in its rightful context, particularly where the cost of 
labour is concerned. This brings us to the recommendation 
that the additional taxation of energy be used to reduce the 
cost of labour in accordance with the recommendations of the 
recent Note published by the CAE31 on the reduction of social 
contributions aimed at low earners. Indeed, whilst industrial 
exporters might employ more skilled workers, service costs, 
which are high in the case of unskilled workers, account for 
more than half of all costs incurred by exporters.
One major performance-related aspect concerns the compo-
sition of the export sector, which, strictly speaking, diﬀ ers 
from competitiveness. Global demand can vary in terms of 
dynamism from one sector to the next (and even from one 
product to the next within a given sector); the sectoral (and 
indeed product-speciﬁ c) targeting of the oﬀ ering therefore 
goes some way to explaining combined performance. At a 
time when global energy prices have greatly increased since 
2000, it is therefore perfectly justiﬁ able to wonder about this 
composition eﬀ ect; are the most energy-dependent sectors 
those that have lost the most in terms of market shares (in 
relation to Germany)? In reality, excluding the success of the 
leather, leather goods and shoe sector already mentioned, 
there is no indication that the most heavily dependent sec-
tors have performed any less well.
31 Cahuc P., S. Carcillo and K.F. Zimmermann (2013): “L’emploi des jeunes peu qualiﬁ és en France”, Note du CAE, no 4, April.
2. Gauging the sensitivity of French 
exports to the price of electricity
We are looking at the exports in terms of value of each 
French exporter (there are some 100,000 every year) to 
each market (there are some 200 potential markets) over 
the 2001-2007 period. This data is recorded by customs 
authorities and combines the sales achieved by each 
exporter in a given year for a particular product cate-
gory and destination. We do not have the information for 
sales of services. We shall therefore explain the varia-
tions in sales from one year to the next by a series of 
control variables speciﬁ c to the destination or the year in 
question and the variation in the price of electricity, both 
alone and taking the original energy dependence of the 
sector into consideration (in order to take into account 
the fact that an increase in prices will have a stronger 
impact on the most energy-dependent sectors). We can 
therefore estimate the impact on exports of a variation 
in energy prices. Our analysis will cover the period up to 
2007 only so as not to take into consideration the erratic 
developments in international trade observed during the 
2008-2009 crisis. A number of sensitivity analyses have 
been performed.
We shall refer here only to the factor used to quantify the 
impact of the 20% increase in electricity pricesa. We shall 
regress the value of exports (in logarithm form) of a com-
pany f in a sector s to country i over the course of year t.
The variables are in logarithm form. The price of electri-
city is the French price. The equation incorporates ﬁ xed 
eﬀ ects (sector-speciﬁ c, destination country-speciﬁ c) 
and a time trend. The coeﬃ  cients are signiﬁ cant at the 
1% threshold, with the exception of the variable rela-
ting to the interaction between price and energy depen-
dence, which is not signiﬁ cant with this speciﬁ cation. It 
only becomes signiﬁ cant (at the 1% threshold) when the 
sample is restricted to the 15% largest market exporters.
a For a more detailed technical analysis see Fontagné L., P. Martin 
and G.L. Oreﬁ ce (2013): French Exporters and Energy Costs, Miméo. 
This data was exploited at the CEPII.
In brackets: standard deviation on the corresponding estimate.
Énergie
Company export  
in value 
=
  
– 0.196 x price  
of electricity 
+
  
0.018 x price x sectoral 
energy dependence 
to a destination  (0.007)  (0.028) 
+ 1.226 x size  
of company 
+ 0.400 x imports of 
destination country 
 (0.002)  (0.013) 
+ 0.549 x GDP of  
destination country
  
 (0.036)   
6. Proportion of taxes on energy and work 
in government revenue
2009 (or most recent year)
Sources: According to OCDE, Revenues Statistics Data Base et OCDE/
AIE, Database on Instruments Used for Environmental Policy and Natural 
Resource Management.
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Recommendations
We have shown that in the event of energy prices increasing to 
a greater extent in France than in rival countries, the short-term 
price competitiveness of French industry would be penalised, 
resulting in a decline in both export activity and employment. 
However, at a time when energy prices are expected to increase 
by 50% (with the exception of coal) over the next twenty years, 
directing industrial innovation eﬀ orts and goods and service 
production towards energy-saving initiatives is absolutely essen-
tial with regards to the dynamics of competitive advantage.
The tension between these two requirements, namely remai-
ning competitive in today’s world whilst preparing for the 
future, requires the right signals to be sent to economic 
players. It should be borne in mind that the price of energy is a 
short-term cost and a long-term signal. A high energy price, or 
the anticipation thereof, is an incentive to invest in new tech-
nologies, new products and new services. There are seven pro-
positions that we would draw from this.
1. The increase in energy prices should be announced so that eco-
nomic agents can adjust their calculation data. In this respect, the 
recent announcement by the CRE of future increases in the price 
of electricity for diﬀ erent types of users expected to be implemen-
ted by 2017 is an appropriate form of communication.
2. The increase should be announced in a credible way; ener-
gy prices should therefore start to increase immediately, at 
least to the extent that our competitors’ energy prices are 
increasing, but the increase should be gradual. This policy 
would lose all credibility in the event of a delay. In this respect, 
the recent episode of the tax reduction applied to the price of 
fuel is a prime example of an undesirable policy.
3. The signal must be sent to both the consumer (to create an 
opening for product innovations) and the producer (to encou-
rage process innovation). It is also important to ensure that the 
signal reaches those areas with the greatest potential for gains 
in terms of both eﬃ  ciency and innovation.
4. The very speciﬁ c situation of France, namely the high taxa-
tion of employment and the low taxation of energy, would lead 
us to recommend that the additional taxation of energy be 
used to reduce the cost of employment. This shift in taxation 
should, however, be a gradual one.
5. We have shown that an increase in electricity costs aﬀ ects 
the performance of industrial exporters, an observation that 
should encourage a cautious approach with regards to the rate 
at which legacy nuclear facilities, the cost per kWh of which 
is particularly attractive, are decommissioned. It is important 
that choices regarding decommissioning be made based on an 
assessment of safety conditions carried out under the supervi-
sion of the French Nuclear Safety Authority but also that they 
take into account the eﬀ ects on economic competitiveness 
documented in the present report.
6. A diﬀ erentiated attribution of the public service charge 
(including funding for the development of renewable energy 
sources) according to energy intensity is perfectly justiﬁ able 
and could exceed existing caps, as is the case in Germany. It 
would also be preferable for approaches at European level to 
be converged where network costs are concerned.
7. The future of energy prices will also depend on innovation in 
terms of the production of energy and not just the consumption 
thereof. Once the defence of dynamic competitive advantage 
is accepted, the issue of sunrise industries and public regula-
tion must be addressed. The “precautionary principle”, equa-
ted with the zero-risk impetus, as it often tends to be in French 
policy, can hinder the development of new sectors, growth 
and even employment. For want of short-term exploitation, 
research should be carried out into techniques for exploiting 
shale gas, in accordance with one of the recommendations of 
the Gallois Report.
Let us end by highlighting the fact that the increase in ener-
gy prices aﬀ ects companies and households in diﬀ erent ways. 
With this in mind, an increase in energy taxation combined with 
a reduction in social security contributions would place a bur-
den on households, which would only partially beneﬁ t from the 
reduction in charges (by means of the increase in employment 
or wage increases). This, of course, raises the issue of energy 
poverty, an issue that exceeds the scope of the present Note and 
should be examined in later works. Systems other than the tem-
porary reduction in fuel tax can be used to deal with the issue of 
energy poverty among low-income households. The allocation of 
a ﬁ xed allowance of the kind already implemented in the United 
Kingdom would be easy to administer and gives the consumer 
the choice of whether or not to use this allowance to purchase 
energy (which tends to result in energy savings). On the other 
hand, deadweight eﬀ ects are not to be ruled out. The bonus-
malus system as it applies to the gas pricing structure adopted 
in France resolves the issue of deadweight eﬀ ects but does not 
help redirect consumption; moreover, the body of information 
required to guide this policy presents a problem with regards to 
its implementation.
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